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Abstract
In this paper we explore the impact of the insurgency and military deployment on the
livelihoods of the local communities in Afghanistan. We use monthly wages and commod-
ity prices at the provincial level over the period 2003-2009 and look for their response to
conflict events and ISAF deployment. Two basic results emerge: first, commodity prices
are not significantly affected by insurgent violence, which is consistent with coping strate-
gies already in place. Second, military deployment is associated with an increase in the
levels of wages and commodity prices.
JEL classification: D74, H56, J30, 013, K42
Keywords: Afghanistan, Consequences of Conflict, Coping Strategies, Military Deploy-
ment
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1 Introduction
Since 2004, there has been a notable increase in the number of security incidents in Afghanistan
from approximately 6,000 troops to 132,000 in 2011. This has been paralleled by a sharp
increase in the size of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) deployment. This
meant more troops in more areas that previously had little or no regular security presence.
The consequences were mixed: more fighting in some areas as militants were pushed away from
the most densely populated districts, and a relatively safer environment in other areas, which
enabled Afghan citizens to return to the homes from which they had been displaced by the
insurgents. The coverage of the Afghanistan war in the media and in academic discussions has
been primarily driven by the huge number of NATO and civilian casualties, the surge in armed
attacks and suicide bombings, and the ensuing deterioration in the level of security in most
part of the country. Reports and analyses have mainly focused on the factors affecting the
raise in Talibans’s activities across the countries and ISAF’s approaches to counter-insurgency.
However, quantitative analyses have never explicitly dealt with the impact that both the
insurgency and the international military deployment could have on the economic conditions of
the local communities. This paper investigates whether increasing levels of insurgency-driven
insecurity in the country and the surge in ISAF activities have different effects on market
prices and wages. We assume that as a result of physical insecurity and the interruption of
local markets, Afghans may decide to employ different income-generating strategies to cope
with the conflict shock. For this purpose, we have gathered a unique dataset with monthly
information on commodity and labour prices, conflict events and ISAF deployments.
[Figure 1 about here]
In particular, we use monthly market prices of wheat, sheep, diesel and the wage of one
day of unskilled labor as they can capture the returns from engaging in their respective
activities and thus proxy the different choices of livelihoods of people. Almost a half of
all Afghan households depends on income from agriculture where wheat is the main crop.
More than 23 percent of the population depends on livestock thus the price of one year old
female sheep is used as an indicator of the purchasing capacity of those households that are
mainly reliant on income from livestock (pastoralism). One third of the population depends
on non-farm labour thus the wage of one day of unskilled labor proxies for the purchasing
capacity of households relying on casual labor as main income. Finally, diesel is a main
commodity and it is held as an asset, together with wheat and meat stocks. The literature
on coping strategies in a state of war suggests that assets play an important role in reducing
the variability of consumption in environments characterized by income risks (Bundervoet,
2010). Prices directly affect asset values, capital gains, and decisions on holding and selling
inventories.1 Prices are also a critical determinant of the overall level of revenues across the
provinces. This means that changes in the level of prices can have adverse consequences
for rural poverty. The coping strategy adopted in Afghanistan entails having members of the
family involved in different types of trades, as a matter of diversifying income. By using wages
and commodity prices, we can differentiate the effects of conflict on existing markets between
employment and exchange i.e. the buying and selling of commodities (see e.g. Justino, 2009).
Moreover, by distinguishing between violence and ISAF casualties we find a way to circumvent
the coping strategies argument. We argue that given that Afghanistan has been in a conflict
for almost four decades, there must be coping strategies in place and therefore little or no
response to attacks. However, ISAF deployment is a relative new phenomenon in this conflict
1 Verpoorten’s (2009) study on coping strategies in wartime, for example, uses cattle sales to explore whether
peasants sold cattle to smooth consumption.
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and their strategies change continually; this allows us to disentangle the response of old coping
strategies to a new type of event.
While a number of factors influence domestic food prices, in particular the seasonality
of production within a production year, adverse weather conditions and the latitude, we
expect insecurity to play a big role in determining price levels. This is important given
the general assumption that high food prices have a negative impact on the livelihood of
people. Significant and frequent changes in the direction and magnitude of food prices make
both smallholder farmers and poor consumers increasingly vulnerable to poverty. While price
fluctuations can put at risk decisions made by farmers about what and how much to produce,
soaring prices reduce the purchasing capacity of the most vulnerable groups, such as low
income urban and rural populations. Because food represents a large share of farmer income
and the budget of poor consumers, large price increases have large effects on real incomes. In
addition, smallholder farmers are less likely to invest in measures to raise productivity when
price changes are unpredictable (e.g. FAO, 2011). Thus, even short episodes of high prices for
consumers or low prices for farmers may lead to poverty traps. Large fluctuations in food and
commodity prices are not only associated with reductions in the value of food consumption,
but also with calorie availability and dietary diversity.2
Conflict has always been part of the everyday life of Afghans, yet studies on the eco-
nomic impact of violence in the country are sparse. Giustozzi (2008, 2009) provides excellent
background material on the Afghan polity and society in times of war, including issues of war-
lordism and nation-building. These books also give further references to a large qualitative
literature on Afghanistan, only a small proportion of which has been cited in this paper. Two
quantitative studies are most closely related to ours. D’Souza & Jolliffe (2012a) explore how
differences in the level of conflict across provinces influence food security and show a negative
correlation between conflict and food security. More interestingly, they find that food prices
increases have a large impact on provinces with lower levels of conflict. Ciarli et al. (2010)
examine the relationship between conflict and entrepreneurial activity. They show small di-
rect negative effects of conflict on the likelihood of household to engage in small businesses.
This insight suggests that entrepreneurs adapt to a permanent state of violence and continue
to operate regardless.3 The above studies use data on households on an yearly basis. We
employ higher frequency monthly information on commodity and labor prices and conflict
events on the provincial level. There are two main advantages of using monthly data: first,
the use of higher frequency indicators allows us to identify the immediate effects of conflict
events. Violent occurrences perturb the economic system and affect commodity prices, which
adjust in response to these shocks to update information on supply factors and risk premia.
Second, by using monthly variations, we can control for seasonality given that temperatures
vary dramatically across seasons, with hot summers and severe winter conditions which affect
production and transportation (D’Souza & Jolliffe, 2012b). This has never been taken into
proper account in the literature on the topic, which uses annual date.
We investigate whether changes in prices respond to security incidents and to what extent
2The World Bank estimates that the 2010 price spikes for foodstuffs have pushed an additional 44 million
people into extreme poverty. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated that the previous
high in food prices, in 2007-8, drove the number of undernourished people worldwide from 915 million to more
than 1 billion, the highest number in more than 40 years (Barrett & Bellemare, 2011).
3A recent work by D’Souza & Jolliffe (2012b) also explores the impact of rising wheat prices on household
food security in Afghanistan. They find large falls in the value of per capita food consumption and significant
trade offs between quality and quantity as households move away from nutrient-rich foods toward staple foods.
While their work brings interesting insights on the impact of food prices on Afghan households, they do not
explicitly deal with conflict and do not include any measure of violence or instability.
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they are affected by the presence of ISAF forces. We anticipate that while price levels are not
generally affected by waves of violence, military deployment is associated with an increase in
the levels of prices. We proceed as follows: section 2 offers a short literature review on the
competing mechanisms linking insecurity and external military deployment to market prices.
Section 3 provides background material on security and development in Afghanistan using
our newly assembled dataset. Section 4 presents the methods used in the analysis. Section 5
discusses the empirical evidence and section 6 concludes the paper and provides policy-relevant
implications.
2 Literature review
War devastates life, health, and living standards; it also disrupts physical infrastructure and
human capital, and may alter social and political institutions (Blattman & Miguel, 2010).
One of the most recent contributions on the topic, Gates et al. (2012), find that war has also
negative effects on progresses in meeting the UN Millennium Development Goals, such as the
reduction of poverty, hunger, infant mortality and on access to water and primary education.
Turmoil also leads to decreased and uncertain supplies of necessities and affects consumption
patterns (Hess, 2003). Although difficult to quantify, this source of uncertainty, combined
with shorter time horizons, adds significantly to the cost of conflict. This is crucial, since
poverty can lead to violence and conflict (e.g. Collier & Hoeﬄer, 2004). Furthermore, over
time the price volatility of primary commodities are critical determinants of the risk of a
return to conflict (e.g. Caruso, 2010). The centrality of the costs of conflict to development is
also duly covered by Bru¨ck & De Groot (2012) and by the World Bank (2011), among others.
Despite a growing number of quantitative studies on war-torn countries, it is not clear
how exactly violent conflict affects production and well-being and how individuals cope with
conflict. This is due to the inherently difficulty in analyzing through a coherent framework
the effects of armed conflicts on households and the ways in which households in turn respond
to conflicts. A more specific literature on coping strategies in war contexts is starting to take
shape. Bru¨ck & Schindler (2009) investigate how conflicts damage households’ core functions
and their choice of coping strategies. Justino (2009, 2012) explores the economic channels
through which war may affect the responses of individuals and their adaptation mechanisms.
She distinguishes between direct and indirect effects, and shows that the indirect effects are
channeled through (i) markets, (ii) political institutions, and (iii) social networks.
In the present study we consider the first channel i.e. markets and we ask what is the
effect of violence on commodity prices. Given the inherent sensitivity of market prices to
uncertainty, they become a potential source of information about the extent of effect of conflict
on the economy. Empirical evidence on price effects of armed conflict is scarce though some
evidence has reported an increase in prices of staple food (Verpoorten, 2005). Moreover,
the destruction of infrastructure should increase transaction costs for households involved in
market exchanges who may decide to return to subsistence activities (Bozzoli & Bru¨ck, 2009;
Justino, 2009). Prices can also be kept artificially high during conflicts if farmers choose to
hide crops so they do not get raided (Azam et al., 1994). However, increases may be more
than offset by decreases in prices of commodities produced and assets held by the household
e.g. livestock, as well as the decrease in access to exchange markets. Overall, negative effects
may prevail due to observed decreases in the price of other commodities and assets like cattle
and other livestock (e.g. Bundervoet, 2006). The channels and intensity of the impact and
people vulnerability to conflict vary in terms of their asset endowments, the characteristics of
the production and their location (Bru¨ck & Schindler, 2009). Also, there might be substantial
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differences across sectors, as industries dependent on either capital or transactions are most
vulnerable to conflict (Vothknecht & Sumarto, 2011).
Studies on how labor markets are shaped by violent conflicts are also sparse. Serneels &
Verpoorten (2012) find that areas that experienced genocide in Rwanda have higher returns
to labour compared to other areas. While, as the authors suggest, we may expect the mass
killings to increase returns to labour, if surplus labour was substantial, these returns may
remain low in absolute terms. Case studies also suggest that conflict entails losses of hu-
man capital, resulting from household investment trade-offs between education and economic
survival (Justino et al., 2011). Moreover robust effects of mass violent conflict are found on
fertility (Schindler & Bru¨ck, 2011) while violence may also cause pessimism about people’s
future prospects (Bru¨ck et al., 2011). These effects may in turn cause a chain reaction and
influence the labor market. Whether the net effect on wages is positive or negative is not
obvious and should be treated as an empirical question. In the following study, we tackle this
question.
Overall, in the specific case of Afghanistan, we might expect conflict to have a small
effect on wages and commodity prices because of coping strategies developed over the last 30
years. Arguably, individuals are accustomed to a conflict environment and have developed
consumption smoothing strategies. There is evidence that coping schemes have been developed
before the start of our sample period (see e.g. Goodhand, 2005). Therefore, both the sign and
the significance of conflict on prices and wages are unclear and debatable.
Another largely overlooked aspect is the considerable amount of resources invested by the
international community to stabilize the country. Questions are often raised about the counter-
productive effects of the presence of international actors. The 2005 Human Security Report
attributes the decline in the number and intensity of wars to the increase in the deployment
of peace and security operations. However, there are no agreed criteria for the success of an
external intervention, because of the lack of agreement on goals and what would have happened
without a deployment. Moreover, the economic impact of military intervention in theater has
been largely neglected due to a lack of reliable economic data on the host country, which are
difficult to collect in times of war, especially in the remote rural areas. Carnahan et al. (2007)
collected field data from the Chief Financial Officers or Chief Procurement Officers in eight
active missions.4 Data suggest an immediate upsurge in economic activity associated with
the restoration of basic security. But more interestingly, they find that the spending from
international staff allowances (e.g. purchase of local goods and services), local procurement
and on national staff wages provided a significant stimulus to the local economy. Using
survey and administrative data from post-war Liberia, Mvukiyehe & Samii (2010) suggest that
deployments seem to stimulate local markets and boost employment possibilities and incomes.
Finally, Caruso et al. (2012) explore the relation between the presence of UN peacekeepers
and cereal production in Sudan: assuming that UN troops are expected to improve security,
they find that a reduction of conflict-related loss of crops is more pronounced in areas secured
by the UN. We are not aware of any systematic studies of the development benefits of military
intervention beyond those discussed here.5
Afghanistan is a very interesting case in this respect, as the country hosts the biggest
and longest military operation undertaken by NATO since its creation. The function of the
ISAF forces is to suppress violent challenge to the Afghan government by assisting it in the
4UNMIK (Kosovo); UNMISET (Timor-Leste); UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone); MONUC (Democratic Republic
of Congo); MINUSTAH (Haiti); ONUCI (Coˆte d‘Ivoire); UNMIL (Liberia); and ONUB (Burundi).
5A comprehensive survey of peacekeeping economic impacts at both local and regional levels, including
trends of how military interventions may develop until 2020, is offered by Tejpar (2009).
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establishment of a secure and stable environment and reducing the capability and will of
the insurgency. The mandate also explicitly refers to improvements in the socio-economic
development.6 Yet, ISAF has also a direct impact on the host county economy through a
number of channels. NATO/ISAF is the single largest spender in Afghanistan and offers a
number of job opportunities to locals. According to NATO sources,7 the United Kingdom
alone has been employing over 2 300 Afghans, which represents USD 2.94 million to the
Afghan economy per annum. Moreover, from 2005 to 2009, the US Government employed
over 20,000 Afghans and procured more than USD 4 billion worth of local goods and services.
In particular, NATO says ”Increasing local procurement in Afghanistan is considered the most
important step in promoting the development of the Afghan private sector and supporting
the economic development of the country. The analysis undertaken by NATO demonstrates
that purchasing local goods and services has the potential to create an economic stimulus for
Afghanistan.”8 The local procurement affects the housing, retail and service markets and the
labour force. We should expect an immediate upsurge in economic activity as a consequence
of the international mission subsistence allowance (MSA) spent on the local economy, local
mission procurements and wages paid to locally hired staff. Therefore, the economic impact of
ISAF on the host economy can be both indirect, through improved security and direct, from
the demand for local goods and services to job training. If, on one hand, ISAF deployments,
especially those not associated to fighting activities can improve the level of security and
reduce the perception of risk, thus lowering market prices, the relatively large amount of
economic resources poured into a developing country naturally overheats the local markets,
thus increasing prices. The security umbrella provided by ISAF also encourages non-state
actors, such as NGOs, and government development agencies, to direct aid and assistance to
host countries. In fact, it is also frequently the case that military operations start at the same
time as increased developmental assistance.9 Again the net effect is not clear-cut and needs
to be determined from the data.
3 Security and development in Afghanistan
In the period covered by our study the Afghan economy has experienced strong economic
growth, with real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate averaging 11 percent per year.
Yet, after decades of war and political instability, and a long-lasting western military inter-
vention (i.e. ISAF), Afghanistan remains one of the world’s poorest countries, with a GDP
per capita hovering around USD 600 in 2007. Its population, estimated at almost 30 mil-
lion, remains largely rural and mostly uneducated. Development indicators published by the
World Bank and the UN rank Afghanistan at the bottom of virtually every category, including
nutrition; infant, child, and maternal mortality; life expectancy; and literacy. The country
is also at the lowest levels of global human security, according to the Human Development
Index. To provide more background material, we now turn to the discussion of our measures
of security and livelihood in the country. We collected information on commodity prices,
wages, security incidents and ISAF deployment over the period 2003-2009. Prices have been
6See http : //www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html.Accessed 25 April 2013.
7see http : //www.aco.nato.int/page26911751.aspx. Accessed 25 April 2013.
8see http : //www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/officialtexts62851.htm. Accessed 25 April 2013.
9There are also areas where international actors such as the UN and the WFP distribute food aid, which
may cause a depression in prices. Yet, field observations show that food aid is not commonly sold in the market
place, thus should not significantly affect our marker prices. It can be deduced that food distributed to the
most vulnerable is used or stored for future consumption and not sold to traders (Favre, 2005).
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recorded in 7 provinces: Badakhshan, Faryab, Ghowr, Herat, Kabol, Kandahar, Nangarhar.
These provinces are heterogeneous in characteristics between them (in terms of population,
geographic location, language), but together they are likely to be representative of the whole
of Afghanistan. Kabol, Kandahar and Herat an the three most populous provinces in the
country, Nangarhar is the fifth, Badakhshan the sixth and Faryab the eight out of 34 by
population. They are also representative of the four main languages spoken in the country
i.e. Pashto, Dari Persian, Turkmen and Uzbek. Figure 1 presents the distribution of the
provinces of our sample on a map of Afghanistan. Together, they represent more than one
third of the total population, have a combined area of 221,800 Km2 out of 647,500 Km2 and
are geographically distributed across the whole country.
[Figure 1 about here]
3.1 Security
We measure violence and security in several ways. Firstly, we look at the effect of all types
of security incidents, ranging from suicide bombings to coordinated assaults on military com-
pounds, to see the cumulative effect of conflict. Secondly, we measure the disruption of peace
with a dummy for the monthly occurrence of violence in a given province to eliminate the
effects of outliers. Thirdly, we analyze the violence connected to the presence of international
military actors, captured by the number of ISAF casualties. Moreover, we separate between
hostile and non-hostile casualties, and use the reported location to measure casualties by
province. While both hostile (e.g. RPG attack, suicide car bomb) and non-hostile casual-
ties (e.g. illness, vehicle accident) indicate the presence of ISAF forces, non-hostile casualties
should be less influenced by the occurrence of fighting. ISAF patrols may increase the per-
ception of security and drive insurgents out of some regions. At the same time, areas where
ISAF forces fight and are killed are bound to be relatively more insecure. This distinction
does not completely purge the presence of ISAF forces from the location of insurgent units.
Schutte (2012) explores in details the nature of ISAF activities against insurgents, including
the difference between indiscriminate and selective violence by ISAF forces.
Our data on the Afghan conflict comes from the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System
(WITS), US National Counterterrorism Center. This dataset is event-based, and includes
information on the event type, date, location, whether the perpetrator is an Islamic Extrem-
ist/Sunni or unknown, and the number of deaths, wounded and kidnapped in each event.10
Daily data on coalition deaths comes from iCasualties.org (accessed 15 April 2013), which
are based on press releases from the US Department of Defense and CENTCOM. We then
aggregated the data by month. The database lists every casualty by name, cause of death,
and location and follows a rigorous recording methodology (see Schutte, 2012, for the most
thorough discussion to date of conflict event data in Afghanistan).11
As Figure 2 shows, insecurity in Afghanistan has dramatically increased since 2004, two
years after the fall of the Taliban. This is primarily a result of the insurgency’s growing
strength. Much of the violence occurred in Southern Afghanistan (e.g. Kandahar, Helmand),
but insecurity has also spread eastwards (e.g. Kunduz), to cover the majority of Afghan
provinces. According to the data, the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police and
ISAF forces are the most frequent targets, but there have also been a substantial number of
civilian casualties. In 2008 and 2010, many Afghan provinces registered a record number of
attacks (see Figure 2). Most of the violent events are usually attributed to the Taliban-led
10The dataset includes 6080 episodes in the period considered
11Complete documentation of iCasualties.org’s methodology is available at http://icasualties.org/
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insurgency. Yet, it is very difficult to distinguish among terrorist movements, insurgencies
and organized crime (linked to the drug trade or otherwise), since their tactics and funding
sources are increasingly similar.12
[Figure 2 about here]
3.2 Commodities
We gathered monthly US$ selling prices of 1 kg of wheat; a one year old female sheep; 1 liter of
diesel; and wage for 1 day of unskilled labour. Prices are from the Vulnerability Analysis and
Mapping (VAM) Market Data, World Food Programme and characterize different market
places. Figure 3 displays wage and commodity prices. The shaded gray areas depict the
variations in prices across Afghan provinces.
[Figure 3 about here]
Overall, the legal agricultural sector, which is a major source of income for the majority of
the population, is slowly recovering from decades of conflict. Household surveys demonstrate
the centrality of crops and livestock prices in the economy of the country. Major crops include
wheat, rice, maize (corn), barley, vegetables, fruits, and nuts. Approximately 70 percent of
cultivated crop area is devoted to wheat and about 15 percent is devoted to rice, barley,
and maize (Chabot & Dorosh, 2007). Almost half of Afghan households depend on income
from agriculture, 33 percent on non-farm labour, 23 percent on livestock and 4 percent on
opium production13. Given the problem of reverse causality between opium prices and the
level of violence that would not permit us to make credible inference - i.e. regional instability
and insurgency may be fueled by the Afghan opiate industry (see e.g. Bove & Elia, 2013, for
an empirical analysis) - we only focus on legal occupational opportunities. The mechanisms
connecting the opium market and the political violence in the country are explored in details
by Rubin (2000), Giustozzi (2007) and Goodhand (2008).
We assume that individuals can choose from a number of legal activities (e.g. wheat and
cereal production, sheep-farming, off-farm casual labour). Most frequently farmers decide
what to plant and how to allocate labour and land on their own.14 Wheat is not only the
main legal crop in rural Afghanistan, it is also the key staple food, accounting for over half
the caloric intake of population (Persaud, 2010). Such a high prevalence of consumption
makes wheat, by considerable margin, the most significant agricultural market to evaluate in
relation to food security. We also use wages to capture the equilibrium between the supply of
labor by the household and the demand for labor from off-farm sources. Wages peaked in the
months following the surge of violence, in 2004, and has been growing ever since the return of
the insurgents in the country (Figure 3). However, if surplus labour is steady, these returns
may remain stable. We treat labor wage as a flexible and accessible smoothing tool, as it
gives short term remuneration and it does not require investment costs. This activity requires
safety, it gives a comparable high return but its variation is higher than other activities.
12As a label, ”AGE” or Anti-Government Elements, brings under one umbrella a complex mixture of groups
and shifting alliances. The three major groups include the Quetta Shura Taliban, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin
(HIG), and the Haqqani Network (HQN). These groups cooperate and coordinate at times and their areas of
operations tend to be geographically determined (USDD, 2010). The United States Department of Defense
says that ”‘the common goals of these groups are to expel foreign forces from Afghanistan and to undermine
the central government ”‘(USDD, 2010, p22).
13According to the United Nations Office for Drug and Crime, in 2009 poppy cultivation created 5.6 jobs per
hectare (UNODC, 2009a). Yet, only one in seven Afghans is reportedly involved in some aspect of the trade,
with 6.5 percent of the population involved in growing poppy (UNODC, 2009b).
14For example, in the 2003-2004 season, 87 percent of poppy growers and 81 percent of non-poppy growers
decided independently the allocation of land between opium and wheat (UNODC, 2004).
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Overall, there is strong seasonal behavior in prices in agricultural markets in Afghanistan.
The breakdown by month reveals general hikes in wheat prices around harvesting times in
spring and autumn (see Figure 3). The major wheat harvest in May-June puts most of the
food on the market. This is followed by minor crops, all harvested in August - September.
During the winter months there is little additional food coming onto the market from domestic
production and stocks need to be sufficient to last until spring. Adverse weather conditions
can create pressure on prices, like the periods of inadequate rains and snowfall during 2008.
Geographical variations in terms of land ownership and sharecropping, which is more common
in the North Eastern and Eastern regions (UNODC, 2004), as well as variations in latitude
and elevations, explain some of the deviation in prices around the mean. Certainly, wheat
prices in Afghanistan are also correlated to international market prices, thus explaining a
common trend across provinces. In the period 2003-2009, the dramatic increase in global food
prices has been accompanied by peaking diesel prices. We consider diesel an intermediate
good in production, therefore its price variation can give us information about local market
disruptions. Diesel and wheat prices are highly seasonal and dominated by the world prices,
so all the provinces we analyze show similar patterns. Sheep and labor prices follow more
idiosyncratic variations across provinces, with pronounced differences in the level of revenues.
In the following econometric analysis, we expect that a confluence of international as well
as domestic factors have an impact on prices. In particular seasonality and other common
factors like international prices, past trends and geographic variations across provinces. Yet,
we believe that insecurity, and the ensuing uncertainty, as well the international military
presence may have important effects on prices. For households that spend the majority of
their budgets on food, high volatility in both revenues and commodity prices led to a severe
erosion of purchasing power, disproportionally affecting poor households. Therefore, if violent
occurrences drive consumption prices up, poor household will be most sensitive to these shocks.
In Tables 1 and 2 we present the summary statistics, the definitions of our variables and
the source.
[Tables 1 and 2 about here]
As we pointed out above, the impact of armed conflict on markets is still subject to debate
and it is not clear whether changes in the level of violence should be associated with changes
in commodity prices. Moreover, coping strategies may be already in place, and there may
be little or no effect of violence on prices and wages, given that Afghanistan has been in a
state of conflict since the late 1970s. However, violence is associated with a higher state of
uncertainty e.g. about one’s own life, and we observe in figure 2 a steadily increasing trend.
Therefore, we expect some effect of violence on prices even if small. As we said, prices capture
the returns from engaging in their respective activities and thus proxy the different choices
of livelihoods of people. Furthermore, we consider unskilled labor wage as a flexible and
accessible smoothing tool in response to sudden violent shocks. This activity gives a high
return comparably to other and its variation is higher than that of other activities. Therefore,
we expect wages to be sensitive to violent episodes.
Violence can have important effects on prices of investment-intensive goods such as herding
and wheat cultivation. These activities require year-round care and can be disrupted by
conflict and uncertainty. This disruption might lead to a fall in the returns and so decrease
the likelihood of incurring the initial investment. Afghanistan is net importer of wheat and
primary goods price variation would reflect relative scarcity. Any risk faced at the local
level could be compensated by imports. Livestock prices may also react to insecurity. In
particular, high uncertainty may lead to people selling their livestock, thereby conflict would
have a negative effect on prices (Verpoorten, 2009). However, sheep herding might yield
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luxury goods, wool and meat, and this would still make it a valuable investment. Arguably,
prices of luxury goods such as wool should have higher prices during conflict duration due to
uncertainty and transport shocks to herds.
Finally, the variation of the price of diesel, an input for production, serves us to evaluate
how intermediate goods and markets are affected by the conflict. The price of diesel tracks
closely the world prices for this commodity, therefore a big part of the variation is exogenous.
However, if part of the local variation can be explained by violence it would give us a clue on
how the local markets are disrupted by the conflict. Furthermore, we expect smaller effect
of violence on wheat and diesel than on wages and sheeps because prices are driven by the
international markets (see Figure 3) and local demand can be met by imports. 15
We interpret the violence variables in terms of perceptions they create. Jones (2011) out-
lines that one of the main reasons for insurgents to consider reintegration are the perceptions
on who is winning the war. Perceptions can drive the prices of commodities due to the hag-
gling processes inherent to Afghan society. We consider the effects of levels of attacks and a
dummy of their occurrence. The latter helps us identify the uncertainty effect due to a simple
change from peace to violence and the former the effect of each additional attack. We also
explore the effect of military deployment on market prices. We use hostile and non hostile
casualties. Increases in hostile casualties would carry the perception of increasing violence
and that ISAF is loosing the war, which entails uncertainty about the rule of law. Non-hostile
causalities indicates the deployment of NATO troops without necessarily indicating the oc-
currence of fighting. Finally, the variable ISAF sums these both types of variation and gives
us a general effect of deployment. As we said above, local procurement of goods and services
is expected to increase both commodity prices and wages.
4 Econometric Model
In our empirical model we look at how different conflict occurrences affect the wages and
prices of everyday consumption goods. In the baseline specification we consider the reduced
form relationship for each price independently:
Pi,p,t = αPi,p,t−1 + βVc,p,t−1 + µp + δm + i,p,t (1)
where the logged price Pi,p,t of good i in province p in period t is explained by past
violence (Vc,p,t−1), past month price (Pi,p,t−1), month fixed effects (δm) and province-specific
fixed effects (µp). δm and µp capture seasonality and geographical features (like latitude and
elevation), ethical composition, etc.16 which play an important role in determining prices’
fluctuations. The coefficient α measures the percentage price changes from a 1 percent wage
increase holding violence constant in a province. The coefficients β measures the percentage
price changes for each additional occurrence of violence. Identification of the effect of conflict
comes from the assumption that commodity prices are exogenous and do not predict violence
or ISAF deployments.17
We chose to take the lag of the independent variables to take the issue of information
spreading into account. Politics and economic decisions in Afghanistan are conducted ”locally”
at the district and village level (Goodhand, 2005). 18 Given that we have data on provinces we
15For e.g. in 2008 during the food crisis prices of wheat in Afghanistan rose because the main importer,
Pakistan, banned exports of this primary commodity. See for more information Persaud (2010)
16Figures 2 and 3 display clearly variations within provinces.
17As we said, this condition does not hold for opium, so we excluded it from our analysis.
18Jones (2011) outlines the main sources of information for individuals: friends, neighbors and village chiefs.
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leave a one month period for conflict information to spread. Earlier lags do not seem to hold
predictive power and do not change results. The long time frame of our panel (72 months)
allows the bias due to lagged dependent variables to tend to 0 (Nickell, 1981; Kelly, 2006).
Only the prices of wheat and diesel exhibit an unit root, which is another rationale for the use
of lagged dependent variables in the estimating equation. We also perform a robustness check
with first differences and note in the tables when the results concur with the levels estimation.
The first difference estimation results are available in the appendix.
We ran also the specification in Equation 1 on a sub-sample which excludes the province of
Kandahar. This province saw one of the highest levels of fighting and thus it might drive some
of the effects we find. For reasons of brevity we do not include tables with those results but
comment where we have found evidence for the above concern. The results of the sub-sample
are also available in the appendix.
5 Empirical results
Table 3 provides estimates for the effects of conflict events on labour. The top of the columns
shows the measure of violence used as an independent variable, while the dependent variable
is unskilled labour wage. From all columns we can see that the wage is positively affected
by past values. In column 1 we examine the effect on all types of attacks on wages and we
notice a barely significant positive effect. An additional attack at time t-1 has a small effect
on wages at time t. In column 2 we examine the effect of attacks as a dummy variable that
takes on the value 1 if there were attacks in a given month and 0 otherwise. This variable
is not affected by presence of outliers and serves as a more parsimonious measure of attacks.
From the summary statistics we can see that there are no attacks roughly half of the time.
This variable seems to have a higher effect than the levels of attacks, leading us to believe that
it is the disruption of peace that influences the bargaining process for wages rather than the
uncertainty associated with the number of attacks. A potential channel would be that the risks
associated with traveling and flexibility are increasing the bargaining power of employees, so
they succeed in securing a higher wage on average. Or, there are less laborers willing to take
up the risks associated with flexible traveling, and more laborers turn to other opportunities,
causing an increase in market wages. In the third, fourth and fifth columns we investigate
the effect of ISAF hostile and non hostile casualties and we find a small positive effect of each
additional non hostile casualty, while hostile casualties have no effect. This partially lends
support to the possibility of increasing wages in reaction to local procurement of services.
The presence of NATO troops increases the level of wages, while fighting activities associated
to the ISAF presence (i.e. hostile casualties) do not show an influence on their own. The
effect of nonhostile casualties is robust to the exclusion of Kandahar and to first differences
estimation (see the appendix).
[Table 3 about here]
Table 4 shows that attacks and disruptions of peace are not associated with forces that
determine the price of sheep. This may suggest that since herding is a relatively mobile
activity, any fighting on the local level can be avoided. Arguably, areas with less rule of
law do not necessarily disrupt the movement of a flock. However, ISAF deployments affect
the selling prices of sheep, given the significance of the coefficient for hostile casualties and
the combined positive effect of hostile and non-hostile casualties. We mentioned earlier the
information sources of Afghanis. Given that the variable attacks pools all types of incidents
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and the close links of villagers to insurgents19, probably they are not able to forecast the
ISAF strategies20 and this is why it is not possible to avoid fighting theaters. This effect is
robust in first differences. However, when we estimate this specification without the province
of Kandahar, the most violent province, we find no effect. This pattern makes sheep herding
the one commodity that is most resistant to conflict, providing a stable source of income.
[Table 4 about here]
In Table 5 we see that wheat prices are mainly influenced by deployment. Wheat is equally
influenced by hostile and non hostile casualties. The positive association between wheat prices
and NATO presence may be driven by the purchasing of local agricultural products and fuel.
The effects of hostile casualties on wheat disappears in the absence of Kandahar in the sample.
As we said, Kandahar is the province with the highest level of violence. Yet, the positive
impact of non-hostile casualties on wheat prices is robust to this exclusion: this means that
results can be explained by the mere presence of ISAF forces, rather than the occurrence
of fighting activities. We also find that the effect of all ISAF casualties to be most robust
across specifications. As we said above, it is also often the case that non-state actors, such as
NGOs, and government development agencies, deploy when security is provided by military
actors. Therefore, international assistance on the ground overheats the wheat market and
causes important increases in wheat prices.
Table 6 shows a general lack of a robust effects of violence on diesel prices. Moreover,
the exclusion of Kandahar makes diesel prices unresponsive to both violence and deployment.
This suggests that Afghanistan is a price taker on the international market and local events
do not influence the price of this fuel.
[Table 5 and 6 about here]
Furthermore, Table 7 presents the interrelationships between the different livelihoods. We
observe that the price of diesel is complementary to the price of wheat.21 The two price move
together and positively influence one another. Diesel is not used in the production of wheat,
so the positive sign might reflect a transport cost associated with the final selling price of
wheat. We note no substitution patterns between sheep herding and wheat. Notably, there
is no significant result for the specification in which labour wage is the dependent variable.
Given the lack of substitution patterns, this would suggest that other activities are preferred
to labour and it would be consistent with labour wage being only a consumption smoothing
tool. The lack of significant patterns would be consistent with coping strategies already in
place and that household members engage and specialize in different activities. The results
remain similar if we estimate a model without lags.
[Table 7 about here]
Overall, we notice that conflict has a positive effect on prices. The effect is higher for
prices that are relatively more variant. The lack of substitution patterns is consistent with
coping strategies already in place and implicit risk aversion. Given that Afghanistan has been
in a state of conflict for the past 30 years, this channel can explain the lack of (or small)
effect of all attacks on prices. However, the ISAF are a new source of uncertainty. They do
not share their strategies with the local population and there are no adaptation mechanisms
at play. Overall we find that prices are more sensitive to deployment than to attacks. In
particular we see a positive effect of ISAF deployment on prices. Price increases are affecting
the vulnerable population and, thus, ISAF deployment benefits the suppliers who can ask for
19Another aspect of the coping strategies is to have one member of the household with insurgents and one
member collaborating with ISAF (Goodhand, 2005)
20Partially due to strategic incentives on the part of ISAF
21The simple correlation between them is 0.81
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a higher price and harms the portion of population on the demand side.
6 Conclusions
War is a destructive event. Political instability and insurgency have strong adverse effects
on economic development and a detrimental impact on the well-being of individuals. The
destruction and loss of life are not the only cost of conflict. The lack of physical safety, the
disruption of important infrastructures and the interruption of local markets make coping
strategies in wartime an important issue. Yet, it is not clear whether and how violence and
the presence of external military actors in a country affect the opportunities and livelihoods of
people. Our study explores the impact of insurgency-related violence and ISAF deployment on
the opportunities for income of the local communities in Afghanistan. As the country has been
suffering from chronic violence and lawlessness for decades, we consider survivalist activities
across a range of occupational choices, such as farming, pastoralism, off-farm activities and
casual labour.
For this reason, we gathered a unique dataset monthly commodity prices: wheat, sheep,
diesel, and wages, to capture the return from different activities in a state of war. We provide
econometric evidence from actual data collected by the World Food Program, which is the only
time series market data available for Afghanistan. We find evidence that coping strategies are
already in place, consistent with the long conflict history of Afghanistan. We disentangle the
effect of deployment from the effect of coping strategies. In particular, we find that commodity
prices are not significantly associated with levels of attacks. However, given that ISAF are
a new actor in the Afghan civil war, we find that military deployment is associated with an
increase in the level of wages and prices of wheat and sheep. The final price of wheat seems to
discount the transport costs associated with diesel. We also find that sheep herding provides
the most stable source of income.
Our study informs current policy discussions within Afghanistan and, more generally,
within the international development community. We provide novel insight into the domestic
and conflict-related determinants of sudden changes in food prices and the possible effects on
an economically vulnerable population. This is particularly crucial in conflict areas, which
may be most susceptible to food price shocks, but which usually have little quantitative data
on violent events. Identifying the impact of war on food and commodity prices is an important
step in understanding how conflict affects household well-being.
Income and Livelihoods in the War in Afghanistan 14
References
Azam, J.P., Collier, P., & Cravinho, A. 1994. Crop sales, shortages and peasant portfolio
behaviour: An analysis of Angola. The Journal of Development Studies, 30(2), 361–379.
Barrett, C., & Bellemare, M. 2011. Why food price volatility doesnt matter. Foreign Affairs,
12.
Blattman, Christopher, & Miguel, Edward. 2010. Civil War. Journal of Economic Literature,
48(1), 3–57.
Bove, Vincenzo, & Elia, Leandro. 2013. Drugs and Violence in Afghanistan: A Panel VAR
with Unobserved Common Factor Analysis. Defence and Peace Economics.
Bozzoli, C., & Bru¨ck, T. 2009. Agriculture, poverty, and postwar reconstruction: micro-level
evidence from Northern Mozambique. Journal of Peace Research, 46(3), 377–397.
Bru¨ck, T., & Schindler, K. 2009. The impact of violent conflicts on households: What do we
know and what should we know about war widows? Oxford Development Studies, 37(3),
289–309.
Bru¨ck, T., Bozzoli, C., & Muhumuza, T. 2011. Does War Influence Individual Expectations?
Economics Letters, 113(3).
Bru¨ck, Tilman, & De Groot, Olaf J. 2012. The Economic Impact of Violent Conflict. Defence
and Peace Economics, 1–5.
Bundervoet, T. 2006. Livestock, activity choices and conflict: evidence from Burundi. House-
holds in Conflict Network.
Bundervoet, Tom. 2010. Assets, Activity Choices, and Civil War: Evidence from Burundi.
World Development, 38(7), 955–965.
Carnahan, M., Gilmore, S., & Durch, W. 2007. New Data on the Economic Impact of UN
Peacekeeping. International Peacekeeping, 14(3), 384–402.
Caruso, Raul. 2010. International relative prices and civil wars in africa: a note. Peace
Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 16(1).
Caruso, Raul, Khadka, Prabin B, & Ricciuti, Roberto. 2012. Do UN troops secure crops?
Evidence from South Sudan. Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University
of Verona.
Chabot, P., & Dorosh, P.A. 2007. Wheat markets, food aid and food security in Afghanistan.
Food Policy, 32(3), 334–353.
Ciarli, T., Parto, S., & Savona, M. 2010. Conflict and entrepreneurial activity in Afghanistan:
Findings from the national risk vulnerability assessment data. Working Paper, World
Institute for Development Economics Research.
Collier, Paul, & Hoeﬄer, Anke. 2004. Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford economic
papers, 56(4), 563–595.
Income and Livelihoods in the War in Afghanistan 15
D’Souza, A., & Jolliffe, D. 2012a. Conflict, Food Price Shocks, and Food Insecurity: The
Experience of Afghan Households. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2236284
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2236284.
D’Souza, A., & Jolliffe, D. 2012b. Rising food prices and coping strategies: household-level
evidence from Afghanistan. Journal of Development Studies, 48(2), 282–299.
FAO. 2011. The state of food insecurity in the world. Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations.
Favre, Raphy. 2005. Political Economy of Wheat Prices in Afghanistan.
Gates, S., Hegre, H., Nyg˚ard, H.M., & Strand, H. 2012. Development Consequences of Armed
Conflict. World Development, 40(9).
Giustozzi, A. 2007. War and peace economies of Afghanistan’s strongmen. International
Peacekeeping, 14(1), 75–89.
Giustozzi, A. 2008. Koran, Kalashnikov, and laptop: the neo-Taliban insurgency in
Afghanistan. Columbia University Press.
Giustozzi, A. 2009. Empires of mud: war and warlords of Afghanistan. Columbia University
Press.
Goodhand, Jonathan. 2005. Frontiers and Wars: the Opium Economy in Afghanistan. Journal
of Agrarian Change, 5(2), 191–216.
Goodhand, Jonathan. 2008. Corrupting or consolidating the peace? The drugs economy and
post-conflict peacebuilding in Afghanistan. International Peacekeeping, 15(3), 405–423.
Hess, G.D. 2003. The Economic Welfare Cost of Conflict: An Empirical Assessment. CESifo
Working Paper Series.
Jones, Seth G. 2011. Reintegrating Afghan Insurgents. RAND Corporation.
Justino, P. 2009. The Impact of Armed Civil Conflict on Household Welfare and Policy
Responses. MICROCON-A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict.
Justino, P. 2012. War and Poverty. IDS Working Papers, 2012(391), 1–29.
Justino, P., Leone, M., & Salardi, P. 2011. Education and conflict recovery: the case of Timor
Leste. IDS Working Papers, 2011(381), 1–50.
Kelly, Nathan J. 2006. Dynamic Models for Dynamic Theories: The Ins and Outs of Lagged
Dependent Variables. Political Analysis, 14(2), 186–205.
Mvukiyehe, E., & Samii, C. 2010. The Subtle Micro-Effects of Peacekeeping: Evidence from
Liberia. In: APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper.
Nickell, Stephen J. 1981. Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects. Econometrica, 49(6),
1417–26.
Persaud, S. 2010. Price Volatility in Afghanistan’s Wheat Market. E-Outlook Report No.
WHS-10d-01. US Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
Income and Livelihoods in the War in Afghanistan 16
Rubin, Barnett R. 2000. The political economy of war and peace in Afghanistan. World
Development, 28(10), 1789–1803.
Schindler, K., & Bru¨ck, T. 2011. The effects of conflict on fertility in Rwanda. DIW Berlin
Discussion Paper.
Schutte, Sebastian. 2012. Violence and Civilian Loyalties: Evidence from Afghanistan. ETH,
Zurich.
Serneels, Pieter, & Verpoorten, Marijke. 2012. The Impact of Armed Conflict on Economic
Performance: Evidence from Rwanda. Tech. rept. Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Tejpar, J. 2009. How do peace support operations impact on conflict regions’ economies?
Fo¨rsvarets forskningsantalt (FOI).
UNODC. 2004. Farmers Intentions Survey 2003/4. United Nations, Office on Drugs and
Crime, Vienna.
UNODC. 2009a. Addiction, Crime and Insurgency The transnational threat of Afghan opium.
United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna.
UNODC. 2009b. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009. United Nations, Office on Drugs and
Crime, Vienna.
USDD. 2010. Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. US Depart-
ment of Defence, Report to Congress, Washington DC.
Verpoorten, M. 2005. Self-insurance in Rwandan households: the use of livestock as a buffer
stock in times of violent conflict. In: CESifo Conference, Munich.
Verpoorten, M. 2009. Household coping in war-and peacetime: Cattle sales in Rwanda, 1991–
2001. Journal of Development Economics, 88(1), 67–86.
Vothknecht, M., & Sumarto, S. 2011. Beyond the overall economic downturn: Evidence on
sector-specific effects of violent conflict from Indonesia. DIW Berlin Discussion Paper.
World Bank, Group. 2011. World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Devel-
opment. World Bank: Washington, DC.
Income and Livelihoods in the War in Afghanistan 17
Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan and the provinces in our sample
Income and Livelihoods in the War in Afghanistan 18
0
5
10
15
20
Av
er
ag
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f a
tta
ck
s
2003m12005m12007m12009m1
Attacks
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Av
er
ag
e 
di
sr
up
tio
n 
of
 p
ea
ce
2003m12005m12007m12009m1
Peace Disruption
0
2
4
6
Av
er
ag
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f c
as
ua
ltie
s
2003m1 2005m1 2007m1 2009m1
ISAF Non−Hostile Casualties
0
2
4
6
8
Av
er
ag
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f c
as
ua
ltie
s
2003m12005m12007m12009m1
ISAF Hostile Casualties
0
2
4
6
8
Av
er
ag
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f c
as
ua
ltie
s
2003m12005m12007m12009m1
ISAF casualties
Figure 2: Security incidents and ISAF casualties with the monthly standard deviation (in
grey) around the cross-sectional mean (black). The vertical axis measures number of attacks
or casualties. Authors’ calculation based on records from iCasulaties.org and the Worldwide
Incidents Tracking System (WITS), US National Counterterrorism Center
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Figure 3: Wage and Commodity Prices with the monthly standard deviation (in grey) around
the cross-sectional mean (black). The vertical axis measures price in US dollars. Source:
Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) Market Data from Afghanistan main cities, World
Food Program
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Standard Between Within Observations Panels Months
Mean Deviation Variation Variation
Labour Wage 3.515 0.982 0.547 0.844 517 7 73.857
Wheat Price 0.301 0.147 0.044 0.144 517 7 73.857
Sheep Price 81.615 15.688 7.870 13.792 517 7 73.857
Diesel Price 0.638 0.225 0.133 0.208 517 7 73.857
Attacks 3.165 4.291 3.115 3.175 504 7 72
Peace Disruption 0.677 0.468 0.263 0.400 504 7 72
Nonhostile 0.203 0.917 0.220 0.893 650 7 92.857
Hostile 0.786 2.253 1.200 1.918 650 7 92.857
ISAF 0.989 2.539 1.343 2.172 650 7 92.857
Table 2: Variables used in the econometric estimation
Name Definition Source
Labour Wage US$ prices of one day of unskilled labour World Food Program
Wheat Price US$ prices of 1 kg of wheat World Food Program
Sheep Price US$ prices of a one year old female sheep World Food Program
Diesel Price US$ prices of one liter of diesel World Food Program
Attacks N. deaths, wounded and kidnapped Worldwide Incidents Tracking System
Peace Disruption Dummy taking a value 1 when Attacks is positive Worldwide Incidents Tracking System
Nonhostile Non-Hostile ISAF casualties iCasualties.org/
Hostile Hostile ISAF casualties iCasualties.org/
ISAF Hostile and Non-Hostile ISAF casualties iCasualties.org/
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Table 3: The Impact of Violence on Labour Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Attacks Peace Disruption Nonhostile Hostile ISAF
Violence (lagged) 0.00290* 0.01659** 0.00498*** 0.00471 0.00472*
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Labour Wage (lagged) 0.85951*** 0.87573*** 0.87761*** 0.87217*** 0.87120***
(0.037) (0.039) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046)
Constant 0.14784*** 0.12262** 0.09440** 0.10034** 0.10103**
(0.036) (0.039) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
Observations 450 450 510 510 510
R-squared 0.810 0.809 0.826 0.826 0.827
Number of provinces 7 7 7 7 7
First Differences - - x - -
No Kandahar - x x - -
Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The top
of the column shows the violence variable used in the estimation. The dependent variable is log transformed
unskilled labour wage. Estimation includes month and province fixed effects. The last 2 lines describe the
robustness checks. An “x” stands for same sign of effect and significance, an “-” stands for no effect.
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Table 4: The Impact of Violence on Sheep Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Attacks Peace Disruption Nonhostile Hostile ISAF
Violence (lagged) 0.00094 0.00446 -0.00090 0.00340*** 0.00229**
(0.001) (0.016) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sheep Price (lagged) 0.93135*** 0.93422*** 0.91758*** 0.91349*** 0.91437***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Constant 0.30713*** 0.29364*** 0.36815*** 0.38497*** 0.38120***
(0.042) (0.044) (0.075) (0.077) (0.076)
Observations 450 450 510 510 510
R-squared 0.828 0.828 0.871 0.872 0.871
Number of provinces 7 7 7 7 7
First Differences - - - x -
No Kandahar - - - - -
Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The top
of the column shows the violence variable used in the estimation. The dependent variable is log transformed
sheep price. Estimation includes month and province fixed effects. The coefficient on lagged sheep price is
significantly different from 1. The last 2 lines describe the robustness checks. An “x” stands for same sign of
effect and significance, an “-” stands for no effect.
Table 5: The Impact of Violence on Wheat Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Attacks Peace Disruption Nonhostile Hostile ISAF
Violence (lagged) -0.00225* -0.01254 0.00391** 0.00212** 0.00252***
(0.001) (0.016) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Wheat Price (lagged) 0.95482*** 0.95249*** 0.96282*** 0.96178*** 0.96140***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -0.01276 -0.01216 -0.01700 -0.01855 -0.01942
(0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 450 450 510 510 510
R-squared 0.934 0.934 0.946 0.946 0.946
Number of provinces 7 7 7 7 7
First Differences - - - - x
No Kandahar x - x - x
Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The top
of the column shows the violence variable used in the estimation. The dependent variable is log transformed
wheat price. Estimation includes month and province fixed effects. The coefficient on lagged wheat price is
significantly different from 1. The last 2 lines describe the robustness checks. An “x” stands for same sign of
effect and significance, an “-” stands for no effect.
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Table 6: The Impact of Violence on Diesel Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Attacks Peace Disruption Nonhostile Hostile ISAF
Violence (lagged) 0.00129 -0.00213 0.00722** 0.00230 0.00349
(0.001) (0.014) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Diesel Price (lagged) 0.91048*** 0.91707*** 0.94431*** 0.94288*** 0.94134***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013)
Constant -0.08632*** -0.07968*** -0.05487** -0.05539** -0.05679**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Observations 450 450 510 510 510
R-squared 0.908 0.907 0.927 0.926 0.927
Number of provinces 7 7 7 7 7
First Differences - - - - -
No Kandahar - - x - -
Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The top
of the column shows the violence variable used in the estimation. The dependent variable is log transformed
diesel price. Estimation includes month and province fixed effects. The coefficient on lagged diesel price is
significantly different from 1. The last 2 lines describe the robustness checks. An “x” stands for same sign of
effect and significance, an “-” stands for no effect.
Table 7: The Substitution Complementarity Table
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Labour Wage Sheep Price Wheat Price Diesel Price
Labour Wage (lagged) 0.76640*** 0.04628* -0.04857 0.16044
(0.099) (0.021) (0.031) (0.096)
Sheep Price (lagged) 0.09994 0.90295*** 0.05192** 0.03200
(0.073) (0.022) (0.016) (0.034)
Wheat Price (lagged) 0.00692 -0.02352 0.90582*** 0.08270**
(0.018) (0.014) (0.012) (0.027)
Diesel Price (lagged) 0.06823 -0.00404 0.09848*** 0.76781***
(0.045) (0.014) (0.022) (0.077)
Constant -0.16606 0.34246** -0.21405** -0.36545***
(0.223) (0.097) (0.061) (0.094)
Observations 510 510 510 510
R-squared 0.835 0.874 0.947 0.935
Number of provinces 7 7 7 7
Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The
top of the column shows the dependent variable. Variables are a log transformation of the respective prices.
Estimation includes month and province fixed effects.
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A Results without Kandahar
The four tables in this section present the results when we estimate our empirical model on a
sample excluding the province of Kandahar.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Attacks Peace Disruption Nonhostile Hostile ISAF
Violence (lagged) 0.00387 0.01804** 0.00499*** 0.00480 0.00502
(0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003)
Labour Wage (lagged) 0.84684*** 0.85828*** 0.85054*** 0.84930*** 0.84878***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.052) (0.054) (0.053)
Constant 0.16219*** 0.14212** 0.11984** 0.12159** 0.12208**
(0.040) (0.042) (0.045) (0.047) (0.046)
Observations 379 379 427 427 427
R-squared 0.787 0.787 0.782 0.782 0.782
Number of provinces 6 6 6 6 6
Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The top
of the column shows the violence variable used in the estimation. The dependent variable is log transformed
labour wage. Estimation includes month and province fixed effects. The coefficient on lagged labour wage is
significantly different from 1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Attacks Peace Disruption Nonhostile Hostile ISAF
Violence (lagged) 0.00123 0.00439 -0.00103 0.00314 0.00111
(0.001) (0.017) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Sheep Price (lagged) 0.93580*** 0.93749*** 0.91602*** 0.91516*** 0.91557***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Constant 0.28274*** 0.27449*** 0.37048** 0.37422** 0.37239**
(0.033) (0.046) (0.092) (0.093) (0.092)
Observations 379 379 427 427 427
R-squared 0.827 0.826 0.855 0.856 0.855
Number of provinces 6 6 6 6 6
Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The top
of the column shows the violence variable used in the estimation. The dependent variable is log transformed
sheep price. Estimation includes month and province fixed effects. The coefficient on lagged sheep price is
significantly different from 1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Attacks Peace Disruption Nonhostile Hostile ISAF
Violence (lagged) -0.00385** -0.01521 0.00361** 0.00142 0.00256**
(0.001) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Wheat Price (lagged) 0.95192*** 0.94984*** 0.96115*** 0.96085*** 0.96069***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -0.01847 -0.01724 -0.02278 -0.02305 -0.02334
(0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 379 379 427 427 427
R-squared 0.931 0.930 0.943 0.943 0.943
Number of provinces 6 6 6 6 6
Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The top
of the column shows the violence variable used in the estimation. The dependent variable is log transformed
wheat price. Estimation includes month and province fixed effects. The coefficient on lagged wheat price is
significantly different from 1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Attacks Peace Disruption Nonhostile Hostile ISAF
Violence (lagged) 0.00224 0.00029 0.00586*** -0.00310 0.00138
(0.001) (0.014) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004)
Diesel Price (lagged) 0.90723*** 0.91340*** 0.93962*** 0.94056*** 0.93924***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Constant -0.08393*** -0.07874*** -0.04908 -0.04850 -0.04909
(0.010) (0.007) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
Observations 379 379 427 427 427
R-squared 0.903 0.903 0.920 0.920 0.920
Number of provinces 6 6 6 6 6
Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The top
of the column shows the violence variable used in the estimation. The dependent variable is log transformed
diesel price. Estimation includes month and province fixed effects. The coefficient on lagged diesel price is
significantly different from 1.
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B First Difference Results
The four tables in this section present the results when we estimate our empirical model with
first difference transformation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Attacks Peace Disruption Nonhostile Hostile ISAF
Violence (lagged) -0.00046 0.00423 0.00326** 0.00132 0.00192
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Labour Wage (lagged) -0.09348* -0.09423* -0.24148* -0.24200* -0.24117*
(0.040) (0.039) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110)
Constant -0.02552* -0.02544* -0.05533** -0.05492** -0.05502**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 443 443 503 503 503
R-squared 0.101 0.101 0.126 0.125 0.126
Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The top
of the column shows the violence variable in first differences used in the estimation. The dependent variable is
log transformed labour wage in first differences. Estimation includes month and province fixed effects.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Attacks Peace Disruption Nonhostile Hostile ISAF
Violence (lagged) -0.00042 -0.00116 -0.00079 0.00213** 0.00120
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sheep Price (lagged) 17947** 0.17908* 0.21740*** 0.22108*** 0.21945***
(0.072) (0.074) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054)
Constant 0.00607 0.00617 0.00499 0.00513 0.00495
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 443 443 503 503 503
R-squared 0.049 0.048 0.055 0.058 0.057
Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The top
of the column shows the violence variable used in the estimation. The dependent variable is log transformed
sheep price. Estimation includes month fixed effects. All price variables are transformed in first differences.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Attacks Peace Disruption Nonhostile Hostile ISAF
Violence (lagged) -0.00060 -0.00192 0.00133 0.00261* 0.00219**
(0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Wheat Price (lagged) 0.14797** 0.14793** 0.10444 0.10559 0.10624
(0.049) (0.049) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Constant 0.03518** 0.03532** 0.02970** 0.03008** 0.02985**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 443 443 503 503 503
R-squared 0.085 0.084 0.055 0.057 0.057
Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The top
of the column shows the violence variable used in the estimation. The dependent variable is log transformed
wheat price. Estimation includes month and province fixed effects. All price variables are transformed in first
differences.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Attacks Peace Disruption Nonhostile Hostile ISAF
Violence (lagged) -0.00070 -0.00141 0.00326* 0.00268 0.00284*
(0.001) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Diesel Price (lagged) -0.11151 -0.11019* -0.20131** -0.20415** -0.20269**
(0.058) (0.055) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057)
Constant -0.05395*** -0.05380*** -0.02873 -0.02815 -0.02838
(0.010) (0.010) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Observations 443 443 503 503 503
R-squared 0.240 0.240 0.188 0.189 0.190
Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The top
of the column shows the violence variable used in the estimation. The dependent variable is log transformed
diesel price. Estimation includes month and province fixed effects. All price variables are transformed in first
differences.
